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Riots Contra Global Capital: Globalization and the
Bangladeshi Workers’ Movement
ADA M B E N JA M I N ∗
“Fast fashion” and “globalization,” often mentioned in the same sentence, make their way to the headlines fairly frequently.
While the conditions of low-wage garment workers are a subject of criticism for clothing brands, few know of the active
workers’ movement in Bangladesh to better them. This movement, often unorganized and violent, takes place against the
backdrop of urban growth, rapid industrialization, and factory disaster. Riots and piecemeal wage negotiations often go
hand in hand in Bangladesh, as the pressures of the world economy exert themselves on Bangladesh’s fragile and unstable
garment industry. This paper examines the history and developments of these garment riots, with an added emphasis on
urban growth and economic crisis. While examining the riots as responses to Bangladeshi circumstances, it places these
riots in the wider context of neo-liberal globalization and the pauperization of industrial workers across the world. With
this at hand, the paper then analyzes various global responses to these working conditions and the infamous Rana Plaza
Disaster.

Int ro d u c t i o n
Globalization today is not a contentious prospect but a contentious reality. While humanity has
maintained a global reach for millennia, never before has it been unified under a dominant mode
of production. Since making its triumph in the 1850s, capitalism has established itself as a
penetrative and unavoidable force in the global economy.1 Unceasing in its growth, capitalism is
now the shared condition of the human community. The degree to which different sectors of the
human community experience capitalism varies, however, depending on their place in peripheral
markets to fully integrated wage-labor economies. Areas now entirely subsumed into the global
marketplace embodied an entirely different socioeconomic arrangement thirty years before. This
rapid industrialization of parts of the Global South has created a world parallel to the globalized
experience in the West, one in which workers frequently perform labor for low wages and produce
largely for western countries.
Paradigmatic of this dark side of globalization, Bangladesh frequently emerges at the center of
conversations concerning global labor malpractice and abuse. After the 2013 Rana Plaza collapse
resulted in 1,134 deaths, becoming one of the largest industrial disasters in history, the general
public began to question the ethics of the global fashion industry, a staple of globalization’s
triumph.2 Though astounding growth rates have catapulted Bangladesh’s place in the Ready-Made
Garment (RMG) sector to second in the world only to China, this rapid industrialization has come
with the cost of inhumane working conditions, repression, abuse, and periodic disaster, among
∗ Adam Benjamin is pursuing a BA in History and Anthropology at WVU. His research interests are political economy,
East African history, urban studies, labor ethnography, and carceral geography. After graduation he intends on applying
to graduate school and pursuing a career in writing. In his free time he enjoys gardening, world cinema, and trips to the
forest.
1Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875, “Chapter 2: Capital” (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975).
2“The Rana Plaza Accident and Its Aftermath,” International Labor Organization, https://www.ilo.org/global
/topics/geip/WCMS_614394/lang–en/index.htm.
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other problems.3 The creation of a mass semi-proletarianized workforce, trapped in abhorrent
working conditions, has generated one of the fiercest and most violent workers’ movements in the
modern era.
While the Bangladeshi RMG workers’ movement lacks the explicit verbal anti-globalization
message found in Chiapas or Seattle in the late 1990s, it is, in practice, a direct response to the
structural issues of globalized production. Labor’s confrontation with global capital in Bangladesh
is mediated by an intricate and layered network of subcontractors and local industrialists. Thus,
the sociopolitical and economic message of the RMG workers’ movement is to be found in the
movement’s internal dynamics as a response to globalized production. The goal of this paper
is therefore to trace the history of Bangladesh’s industrialization and, more specifically, labor’s
response to it. This analysis includes both the circumstances the labor movement finds itself in
(the form) and the means by which labor responds to them (content).
In 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013, and to the present day there have been repeated
labor revolts involving general strikes, blockades, factory burnings, and riots. In Bangladesh,
strikes, hartals, and riots respond specifically to poor safety standards, low wages, and poor living
conditions, but also more generally to the structural immiseration imposed by the needs of global
capital and generated by globalized production. The frequency of these revolts, coupled with
repeated industrial disasters, points to a situation that has not improved despite the interventions
of global labor and human rights organizations. The labor situation in Bangladesh has remained
one of a poorly employed, superfluous, disposable, and marginalized population responding to
its conditions through general strikes, riots, and factory burnings. These tactics are means of
circumventing structurally imposed limitations, including but not limited to legal measures taken
by the state to curtail the labor movement. Industrialists, pressured to keep wages low to stabilize
investment incentive and increase profit margins, are consistently forced to informalize production
and lengthen the working day. The workers’ response to these globalized conditions, including
their tactics and outreach, as well as their general living and working conditions, will be at the
forefront of this analysis.
Yet while the Bangladeshi labor movement clearly responds to its historically specific
circumstances, the riots and strikes seen within the country are also part of a wider and more
generalized trend of marginalized and pauperized populations responding to conditions of
economic downturn and/or immiseration, often exacerbated by specific situational tensions.
Similar conditions can be seen in the US in Ferguson and Baltimore, China, Greece, London, and
Vietnam, all of which contain populations essentially superfluous to the industrial economy. The
creation of these surplus populations is largely intertwined with the rise of neoliberal globalization,
and I will view Bangladesh within this context.
Also common to neoliberal globalization is the movement from the country to the city, which
has for a large part given rise to the semi-proletarianized population in Bangladesh. Dhaka and
its industrial suburbs have been the destination of this mass migration and the sole terrain of the
RMG movement. The connection between the ever-expanding slums and industry are a primary
factor in the Bangladeshi situation, as the slums continue to grow and industry pulls from their
inhabits as their primary labor source. State operations to police these slums are critical in their
attempts to discipline this expanding, pauperized, and thus obstreperous population. Analysis of
industrial transformation must take into account the geographical one.
The state’s response to labor unrest in this transformative process will be considered in
its attempts to appease workers through concessions and legal reforms, all the while setting
3“Bangladesh Remains 2nd Largest RMG Exporter Accounting 6.5 Percent Market Share,” Textile Today, August 7,
2018, https://www.textiletoday.com.bd/bd-remains-2nd-largest-rmg-exporter-accounting-6-5-percent/.
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preventative measures against wildcat strikes and labor revolt. This includes illegalizing certain
forms of strikes, institutionalizing labor unions, and creating an “industrial police force” to oversee
and curtail potential workers’ unrest. To the Bangladeshi state this is necessary to maintain stable
production and investment by ensuring a somewhat complacent working population. These legal
structures and developments in state power are subject to a historical genesis alongside forces
of production. When Bangladeshi industrialists are primarily working in terms of globalized
capitalism, however, they will be held accountable to international standards.
In this vein, the final point of analysis will examine how global labor and human rights
organizations have responded to the Bangladeshi situation. The most notable intervention on
behalf of these organizations came in the form of the Accord and Alliance, made with fashion
companies in the wake of the Rana Plaza collapse. Though they embody globalization’s selfregulatory response to its pitfalls, in the liberal view, they have often come up short in their
aspirations. Why, and more importantly, how they have come up short provides pertinent answers
to the historical situation in Bangladesh’s globalized RMG sector.
The complexities of the sequential labor revolts can be analyzed by taking into account the
nature of globalized production. The historical process of Bangladesh’s industrialization was
one under the auspices of global capital, more specifically during its neoliberal period. The
industrialization of Bangladesh contains a content unique to its historical situation. As will be
seen, the influx of this population to the city as the result of the emergence of the RMG sector can
be traced to a specific neoliberal policy, the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), which triggered the
seeds of production to germinate. Where European workers in the nineteenth century responded
to the changing, internal, dynamics of pre-industrial society, the labor movement in Bangladesh
responds to a mechanized and mature mode of production subsuming local production into a
global market.
Th e P r i vat i z ati o n o f Ba ng l a d e s h a n d t h e G e n e s i s o f t h e R M G S e c t o r
Surrounded entirely by the Bay of Bengal and bordering India and Myanmar, Bangladesh is a
young country, even relative to the post-colonial world. Born out of a devastating and repressive
war with Pakistan in 1971, what was formerly known as East Pakistan at first took on a socialist
planning model and nationalized all industry. In line with the decline of twentieth-century socialist
states, however, these policies proved to be unstable and were abandoned in favor of the “New
Industrial Policy.” This policy aimed to support private investment and denationalize all industry,
including the nucleus of the then-nationalized garment sector, which was returned to its former
private ownership.4 To bolster this move toward private ownership, the Bangladeshi state moved
again to privatize with the “Revised Industrial Policy” in 1986, eventually following it up with
more policy to phase out state-owned enterprise in 1991.5
Whether the privatization policy was the response to the failure of socialist nationalization
schemes or a direct capitulation to the neoliberal era, it nonetheless was integrated into the
neoliberal transformation of the global economy. Incentivized toward promoting free trade
standards and pursuing policy geared toward slashing bureaucracy, the Bangladeshi RMG sector
began to take root amongst its forming national bourgeois. By 1986 the Bangladeshi state had
fully embraced Margaret Thatcher’s infamous line, “There Is No Alternative,” or TINA. The
4Md. Nurul Momen, “Implementation of Privatization Policy: Lessons from Bangladesh,” Innovation Journal: The
Public Sector Innovation Journal 12, no. 2 (2007).
5Ibid.
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state believed financialization and liberalization to be key to achieving independent economic
growth contra import substitution. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
pressured Bangladesh to continue privatization, going as far as to enable and help create the
Export Processing Zone (EPZ).6 Now in the hands of domestic capital, the RMG sector grew to
become the backbone of the Bangladeshi industrial economy.
Between Fiscal Years (FY) 1986-1987 and 2006-2007, the number of textile factories grew
exponentially from 629 to 4,490, while the total number of exports in millions of US dollars
went from 298.7 million to 9.21 billion.7 Between FY 1989-1990 around 340,000 people were
employed in the RMG sector. By FY 1994-1995 employment grew by 1.2 million, and finally by
FY 2009-2010 it reached approximately 3 million people.8 By FY 2013-2014 the RMG sector
dominated the Bangladeshi economy, consisting of 84 percent of all exports and making up 14.17
percent of the country’s total GDP (though this later began to fall, see below).9
While privatization schemes led to the growth of private domestic ownership on a mass scale,
the RMG sector was aided by free trade agreements meant to integrate underdeveloped countries
into the world economy. The most notable of these was the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA),
which imposed import quotas on developed countries to purchase from their underdeveloped
counterparts while curtailing market domination from powerhouses such as China and India.10
The result of the MFA, which was in effect from 1974-1994, was highly beneficial to Bangladesh’s
RMG sector. Not only did it allow export by volume to grow in Bangladesh, it also gave impetus
to larger producers such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China to begin shifting apparel
investment toward these underdeveloped countries such as Vietnam, Honduras, and Bangladesh.11
The Bangladeshi RMG sector, almost entirely within the hands of domestic producers, began its
contracting system.
The termination of the MFA in 2005 brought about anxiety concerning Bangladesh’s future
in the RMG sector and as a major exporter. Bangladesh, while now enriched with noteworthy
productive capacity, could not be expected to compete with China and India on the global market,
let alone the ROK. This initially caused panic and confusion amongst investors and industrialists
alike, worrying that the end of the MFA would trigger a large capital flight from Bangladesh.
According to a 2003 Textiles Intelligence press release, “Ultimately, garment makers in Mexico
and Bangladesh will have to adopt strategies appropriate for a world in which winners will be
decided on the basis of their international competitiveness – not on the basis of their quota-free
access to the major markets.”12
Yet hopes for Bangladesh outweighed panic in comparison to other prominent garment
exporters such as Mexico for two reasons: one being the fact that 95 percent of Bangladeshi
factories were under domestic control, preventing the flight of constant capital, and the other
6Pragya Khanna, “Making Labour Voices Heard During an Industrial Crisis: Workers’ Struggles in the Bangladesh
Garment Industry,” Labour, Capital and Society / Travail, Capital Et Société 44, no. 2 (2011): 108-110.
7Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, “Trade Information.”
8M. E. Khan et al., “Living Wage Report: Dhaka and Satellite Cities; Context: the Garment Industry,” Global
Living Wage Coalition, 2016, 11-12, https://www.isealalliance.org/sites/default/files/resource/2017-12/Dhaka_Living_
Wage_Benchmark_Report.pdf.
9Ibrahim Hossain Ovi, “Apparel Sector’s Contribution to GDP Growth Going Down for Years,” Dhaka Tribune,
April 26, 2019, https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2019/04/26/apparel-sector-s-contribution-to-gdp-going-downfor-years.
10M. S. Alam et al., “The Apparel Industry in the Post-Multifiber Arrangement Environment: A Review,” Review of
Development Economics 23, no. 1 (2018): 454-474.
11Ibid.
12“Garment Industries in Bangladesh and Mexico Face an Uncertain Future,” Textiles Intelligence, October 15, 2003.
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being their consistently low wages, some of the lowest in the world.13 The latter became their
primary means of holding their precarious position in the marketplace, bringing in swaths of
investment and maintaining the rising export rate.
The recently proletarianized workers, torn from their agricultural life and subject to slum
dwellings, faced abusive and substandard conditions typical of low wage labor and infamous to
Bangladesh. With wages seemingly invariant and conditions unimproved, the workers sought
channels of power by which to respond. The typical organs of class power, namely organized
labor, had also changed alongside Bangladesh’s neoliberal transformation. While playing a
significant role in the independence movement, organized trade unions later became integrated
into political parties, creating distrust among the workers for their unions and what Pragya Khanna
identifies as a superstructural divide between workers and their unions.14 This created a situation
in which workers were “less likely to be belong to a labor union than to be involved in informal
resistance.”15 The working class was at a tipping point with no hand to guide its outpour.
This complete rearrangement of socioeconomic conditions created tensions unresolvable
outside the realm of political and economic struggle. Prior to the industrial transformation, 88
percent of the Bangladeshi population was in subsistence agriculture with an overall literacy
rate of only 24 percent.16 By 2010, Dhaka became the fastest growing city in the world with an
industrial landscape describable as “Dickensian.”17 Through neoliberal reforms and capitulation
to Structural Adjustment Programs, Bangladesh created a canker sore for neoliberalism’s public
appearance and an industrial nightmare for much of the population. Workers, now pressed
under brutal conditions and without strong and resolute institutional power, began to respond to
this strenuous position they found themselves in. Through a variety of circumventions toward
structural limitations and informal resistance tactics, Bangladeshi RMG workers would initiate
their discordant, violent, and abstruse bargaining game with the RMG sector. In other words, for
them TINA would not be an option.
“On the streets and damaging factories”: The Bangladeshi Labor Battles
and t h e C i t y o f D h a k a
Unions, as mentioned before, had already played a politically important role in the independence
movement. After their politicization, however, the workers had little outlets for their growing
discontent. The breaking point of the Bangladeshi working class came in 2006, exhausting the
already fragile and tense social landscape and ripping its frail fabric at the seams. A year earlier,
in 2005, a deadly collapse of a Savar-based garment factory killed one hundred people.18 Before
that there had been eight factory collapses and fires from 1990-2005, resulting in a total of around
243 deaths. With stagnant, low wages, and poor living conditions, the labor pool of Bangladesh
was now a kettle waiting to boil over. This kettle continued to boil over from 2006-2019, each
time with rage pointing to a specific problem, yet indicative of a general immiseration.
13Ibid.
14Khanna, “Making Labor Voices Heard,” 111-113.
15Hasan Ashraf and Rebecca Prentice, “Beyond Factory Safety: Labor Unions, Militant Protest, and the Accelerated
Ambitions of Bangladesh’s Export Garment Industry,” Dialectical Anthropology 43, no. 1 (2019): 93-107.
16Samantha Smith, “The Multi-Fibre Arrangement: A Threat of Protectionism,” Trinity College Student Economic
Review (1998), https://www.tcd.ie/Economics/assets/pdf/SER/1998/Samantha_Smith.html.
17Erik German and Solana Pyne, “Dhaka: Fastest Growing Megacity in the World,” Public Radio International,
September 8, 2010, https://www.pri.org/stories/2010-09-08/dhaka-fastest-growing-megacity-world.
18Khanna, “Making Labor Voices Heard,” 119.
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In May of 2006, as Bangladeshi workers ravaged the city and stormed the factories, the Daily
Star asked one worker of his class’s antics to which he responded, succinctly saying, “They do
not pay us wages regularly. So we are on the street and damaging factories.”19 That very day a
garment worker of the Savar EPZ was killed after factory owners mobilized their sympathetic
workers against the insurrectionaries.20 One worker, while vandalizing a factory, complained
for lack of two-months’ pay.21 By the end of the day two RMG units were burned and two
hundred damaged. With this protest coming after a week-long shutdown of EPZs, this had been
the strongest show of force from Bangladeshi RMG workers yet.
By the end of strike, three hundred factories had been damaged and a number of workers had
been killed.22 The strike, spontaneous and without official union guidance, was also notable for its
seeming success. The Bangladeshi government attempted to meet pay raises and improvements
to general working conditions with the hallmark Bangladesh Labour Act of 2006. This legislation
guaranteed a minimum wage and compensation for injuries among other things, yet was eventually,
and presciently, met with workers’ skepticism following its enaction. Demonstrative of the
superstructural divide that Khanna gives name to, some workers accused unions, the state, and
industrialists of an “unholy alliance” with each other when creating the Labour Act.23 Syed
Sultan Uddin Ahmed, a member of the Bangladesh Institute of Labor Studies (a terminus point of
this revolt), subsequently denied this accusation of collaboration, adding that the responsibility of
the legislation failure was that of the industrialists for not implementing it.24
The legislation itself, however, did much to curtail the growth of these spontaneous labor
revolts, as it did improve general working conditions, imposing and contributing to the structural
limitations imposed against the labor movement. Article 13(1) of the Labour Act, for example,
gives explicit permission for factories to close down and fire their workers if a strike is declared
illegal by the state.25 As will be seen, this provided even greater precedent for mass firings
following labor upheaval.
But one of the most forthright draconian measures against the labor movement came the
following year in 2007. After a series of political upheavals, the Bangladeshi government under
the control of the president Iajuddin Ahmed would declare a state of emergency ahead of upcoming
elections. According to the New York Times, “such measures have not been taken in Bangladesh
since the restoration of democracy in 1991 after years of military rule.”26 During this state of
emergency, Ahmed also placed an explicit ban on strikes, hoping to keep striking power out of the
hands of political opponents. This declaration was seen by many, including businessman Syed
Manzur Elahi, to be a strong implication of military rule, with Elahi stating: “As it is we have an
image problem. . . . [T]his will multiply the problem.27
In spite of this authoritarian takeover, RMG workers continued their battle against management,
striking and rioting against the closure of a factory in Tejgaon and for a bonus for the Muslim
holiday of Eid and a wage of 5,000 taka (Tk) a month, a mainstay demand of the RMG workers’
19“EPZ Workers go Berserk,” Daily Star, May 23, 2006.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
22Khanna, “Making Labor Voices Heard,” 120.
23Md Hasan, “Accords with Workers Hardly Implemented,” Daily Star, May 31, 2006, https://www.thedailystar.net
/2006/05/31/d6053101085.htm.
24Ibid.
25Bangladesh Labour Act of 2006, “Chapter II, Article 13 (1): Closure of Establishment.”
26Somini Sengupta, “Bangladesh Leader Declares State of Emergency,” New York Times, January 11, 2007,
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/11/world/asia/11cnd-bengla.html.
27Ibid.
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movement.28 While 3,000 workers took to the streets, damaging twenty factories and injuring
two police officers, the Bangladeshi government subsequently utilized its legal power over labor,
closing four units of a garment factory “for an indefinite period of time” while citing the Labour
Act.29 When pressed by police officials to negotiate with workers, the bosses summarily responded
that they “were not bound to have talks with the workers.”30 Workers, however, claimed abuse: “A
number of affected workers said the owner used to force them to work under inhuman conditions.
They alleged that factory officials would forfeit a significant part of the salary and overtime bill if
anyone was found taking rest even for a minute during work hours.”31
In 2008 unions attempted to negotiate with industrialists and quell the ferocity of labor revolt
by bringing workers back into the fold of mainstream trade unionism. Representative again of the
superstructural divide, the trade unions nonetheless failed in their ambition. Amirul Haque Amin
(secretary of the National Garment Workers Federation (NGWF), said with dismay to the Daily
Star, “We know we have a lot of responsibilities in the wake of any unrest in the industrial sector.
But, sometimes we feel helpless as we have no control over the workers.”32 He would later go on
to cite lack of effective unionization at the point of production as one of two primary factors for
this problem.33
With the failure of the trade union negotiations at hand, workers’ wages remained stagnant.
The fight for Tk5,000 a month was becoming growingly unrealizable through dialogue, as
negotiations continued to conclude below this demand. But the strike wave of 2006-2007 was
also by no means the end of the labor struggle. In 2009 RMG workers again went up against
their bosses following the closure of the Ha-Meem Group factory, which employed one thousand
workers in Ashulia. Originally contained to workers of the Ha-Meem Group factory, this revolt
soon spread and fifty thousand workers in Ashulia joined the original group in damaging and
vandalizing over fifty factories.34 While the Daily Star cited the 2008 Financial Crisis and decline
in global demand for the “sick” Ashulia factory, the rapid spread of one factory’s upheaval to a
more general population of RMG workers signifies the more unanimous feeling of discontent
amongst workers.35
But while wage battles and riots continued to grip the RMG sector, other, more indirect
structural consequences of the RMG sector’s brutality would begin to emanate in textile factories.
In 2008, for example, there was an uptick in sightings of ghosts and witches, many of which were
said to haunt the floors of RMG factories. As a result of this, many workers actively refused to
work in these factories until their exorcism.36 Seemingly sociocultural and even irrational at first,
these sightings are more indicative of the immiserated daily life that workers lead. Low caloric
intake and grueling hours had led workers to extreme psychological problems, with one doctor
citing over one hundred cases of anxiety disorders among RMG workers per month, stating:

28“Tejgaon Garment Workers Vandalise 20 Factories,” Daily Star, September 23, 2007, https://www.thedailystar.
net/news-detail-5091.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
32Refayet Ullah Mridha, “Weak Trade Unions Fail to Tackle Labor Unrest,” Daily Star, September 14, 2008,
https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-54695.
33Ibid.
34Refayet Ullah Mridha, “It All Started with the Sacking in a Sick Unit,” Daily Star, June 29, 2009, https://www.
thedailystar.net/news-detail-94829?amp.
35Ibid.
36Kelsey Timmerman, “Bangladeshi Workers Attacked by Ghosts,” Where Am I Wearing? http://whereamiwearing
.com/2008/09/bangladeshi-workers-attacked-by-ghosts/.
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“Poor garment workers suffer mainly from malnutrition and anxiety, which make them weak and
vulnerable to nervous breakdown.”37
Wage battles, then, were simply the most direct and immediately recognizable point of
discontent for workers. Other problems, however, namely psychological and medical ones, were
the more indirect consequences of the structural reality of globalized production in Bangladesh.
With this perspective, “poor working conditions” are only a stand-in for a wider, underscoring
immiseration of RMG workers’ lives.
The correlation of the 2008 Financial Crisis and “sick factories” of the 2009 uprising are
still accentuations of a wider trend of the pauperization of RMG workers, with the uprising
triggered by a shift in demand and factory closure but underscored by the general discontent of
RMG workers. The psychological trauma of the workers is indicative of this immiseration that
generated the repeated violent response on behalf of workers. Nonetheless, struggle for higher
wages then defined the 2006-2010 strike wave on the ground in verbal demands, culminating in a
more extensive and persistent campaign for Tk5,000 in 2010.
The 2010 wage battle came after a global report from the International Trade Union
Confederation (ITUC) stated Bangladesh’s working conditions were some of the worst in the
world, with exploitation on the rise.38 During this strike, police fought with workers, allegedly
including children, in the streets, as workers pelted them with rocks and vandalized cars in
response to massive wage cuts.39 Feeling undermined and exploited, one rioting worker stated
“We were forced to take to the streets as the owners exploited us right under the government’s
nose. I have to spend Tk1,000 for food and Tk1,500 for house rent. How will I maintain other
things with this wage?”40 After workers blockaded roads and attacked commercial districts
throughout Dhaka, the government conceded to a fixed entry-level minimum wage at Tk3,000,
much below Tk5,000 RMG workers had been fighting for throughout the strike wave and much to
the discontent of the workers.41
Beneath the fight for Tk5,000, however, was the ever decreasing purchasing power of the
Bangladeshi worker. As studies have shown, while wages in larger industrializing countries such
as China rose in purchasing power, from 2001-2011 the purchasing power of Bangladehsi workers
fell by three dollars despite tenuous wage raises.42 To underline this decline in purchasing power,
while incidents reported by the media highlighted the largest ruptures in the Bangladeshi labor
movement, the Bangladesh Institute of Labor Studies counted 358 incidents of worker unrest
from 2008-2009 and 72 incidents in 2010.43
The labor movement itself continued into the 2010s. In 2012, worker unrest spilled over as
attacks on factories again, burning cars and ransacking around ten factories, blockading roads and
lighting barricades on fire.44 This action, starting in one Ashulia factory and spreading rapidly
amongst RMG workers, was again demonstrative of a generalized discontent with conditions.45
37Ibid.
38Jason Burke, “Children Beaten by Bangladeshi Police as They Join Garment Workers’ Strike,” Guardian, June 30,
2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/30/bangladesh-strikes-children-beaten-police.
39Ibid.
40“RMG Wage Sparks Violent Protests,” Daily Star, July 31, 2010, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-148818.
41Ibid.
42Jenni Avins and Marc Bain, “The Thing That Makes Bangladesh’s Garment Industry Such a Huge Success Also
Makes It Deadly,” Quartz, April 24, 2015, https://qz.com/389741/the-thing-that-makes-bangladeshs-garment-industrysuch-a-huge-success-also-makes-it-deadly/.
43Bjorn Claeson, “Enemies of the Nation or Human Rights Defenders?: Fighting Poverty Wages in Bangladesh,”
International Labor Rights Forum, 2010.
44“More Violence in Ashulia RMG Belt,” Daily Star, June 13, 2012.
45Ibid.
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Five months later, however, came the Tazreen fire, one of the worst industrial disasters in
Bangladeshi history, which claimed 112 lives.46 Only a year later, the Rana Plaza disaster became
the worst industrial disaster in modern human history (see above).
The direction of the labor movement’s focus, however, shifted away from wage battles alone
and added a direct response to structural disaster in factories, something that eventually garnered
worldwide attention. In 2013, after Rana Plaza, workers, assisted by residents, burned a Gap,
Wal-Mart, and Zara factory, which created $100 million in damages.47 At one point two hundred
thousand workers, while also pressing for higher wages (this time Tk8,000, perhaps after being
emboldened by a global spotlight) alongside safety standards, burned factories and even cars in
response.48
The state’s response to the factory revolts has mostly been that of repression and attempts to
circumvent this movement’s capabilities. One journalist, for example, was arrested in 2017 for
“false” reports that could incite garment workers, citing again the Labour Act as legal precedent.49
In the same incident, labor law was cited as allowing factories to close given an illegal strike.50
In 2012 Aminul Islam, a prominent labor activist, was found dead outside the city. For some
observers such as Scott Nova, executive director of the Workers’ Rights Consortium, this was a
sign of a deteriorating situation: “There have been unionists killed in clashes with the police in
the midst of protests, but no recent case of assassination. Thus, this represents a deterioration of
an already grim labor rights situation in the country.”51 A deterioration of the situation, according
to Nova, and an intensification of a state power built to stabilize and uphold the backbone of
its economy. In the wider view of the globalized developing world, these measures would be
what Mark Anner calls the despotic version of the “market control regime,” by which organized
labor is curtailed by weak labor markets and, in the case of Bangladesh (and also Indonesia),
the state attempts to exert parameters toward embryonic or underdeveloped labor movements.52
According to Anner, the establishment of the market control regime leads to workers seeking help
from international labor organizations as opposed to other forms of protest such as wildcat strikes
and riots. The peculiarity of this claim is most evident in the fact that while labor accords and
international organizations have been an undeniable part of the Bangladeshi labor movement, the
riot and factory burning has also been mobilized as a tactic in as much as the state has developed
its repressive apparatus around it.
The workers’ revolt in 2010 in response to massive wage cuts, for example, was followed
by the intensification of state power in the form of the Industrial Police, founded only months
later with the goal of preventing and monitoring labor unrest.53 The creation of the repressive
46Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, Kathy Chu, and Tripti Lahiri, “Bangladesh Fire Raises Pressure to Improve Factory Safety,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2012, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732429
6604578176983283834310.
47Serajul Quadir, “Workers Burn Down Bangladesh Garment Factory That Supplied Gap, Wal-Mart, Zara,” Business
Insider, December 3, 2013, https://www.businessinsider.com/workers-burn-down-bangladesh-garment-factory-thatsupplied-gap-wal-mart-zara-2013-12.
48James Pogue, “Bangladeshi Workers are Rioting and Burning Down the Terrible Factories They Work In,” Vice,
September 24, 2013, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/znwex5/bangladeshi-workers-are-going-berserk.
49David Bergman and Muktadir Rashid, “How Repressive Law Enforcement Crushed Minimum Wage Protestors in
Bangladesh’s Garment Sector,” Wire, February 2, 2017, https://thewire.in/labour/bangladesh-garment-workers-minimumwage.
50Ibid.
51Julfikar Ali Manik and Vikas Bajaj, “Killing of Bangladeshi Labor Organizer Signals an Escalation in Violence,”
New York Times, April 9, 2012.
52Mark Anner, “Worker Resistance in Global Supply Chains: Wildcat Strikes, International Accords, and Transnational
Campaigns,” International Journal of Labour Research 7, no. 1-2 (2015): 17-18.
53“Industrial Police Launched,” Daily Star, October 4, 2010, https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-157098.
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state is then the continuous unfolding of its regulatory power exerted upon the spontaneous labor
movement. Or, in the words of Home Minister Sahara Khatun: “The activities of this newly
formed branch of police is not the same as the general activities of police. It’s a specialized branch
engaged in resolving all sorts of unwanted situation in industries especially in garment sector.”54
This winding and often circular battle between the state and RMG workers that has taken place in
and around Dhaka is also more historically situated than an immediately globalized movement.
The mainstay tactic of the revolts, the riot, is also an indigenization of industrial struggle as much
as it is a response to global industrialization. The violence expressed at the hands of the workers
is a markedly South Asian tactic known as the hartal, mass rioting toward a certain political
or economic goal. These are often used by political parties, and in the case of Bangladesh the
workers’ revolts are often co-opted by them with the promise of improved conditions.
In 2013 alone, for example, hartal generated $7 billion in damage with over $200 million
for each day of strikes.55 One case points to a manager of a GAP supplier losing his truck to
a riot, resulting in 2,500 garments in flames.56 Or in other words, “it’s enough to bankrupt a
factory.”57 Thus while the hartal is a certainly indigenous tactic, it has transformed into one of
industrial labor. Given the ability of the workers to bring production not only to a standstill,
but to its demise, the hartal is the logical conclusion to the institutional restraints on labor. Its
effectivity in circumventing these limitations has made it a continuous asset of Bangladeshi labor
on the ground, with unions unable to hold workers accountable due to the superstructural divide
experienced between organized labor and workers
The strikes and hartals inflict massive financial losses – the workers’ means of disrupting this
local economic system. The function of the industrial police is therefore to stabilize the situation
against the threat of riots and strikes as well as dangers to the already low profit margins. Given
that the draw of foreign investment in Bangladesh is low wages, the primary object of the state is
the defense of its economic interests, and granting a living wage to Bangladeshi workers would
be severely detrimental. The state then has no option but to weaponize itself to suit the needs of
an ever-mobile capital. In 2012 factory owners in parliament actively worked to undermine and
block legislation after the Tazreen disaster that might have improved general working conditions.
When speaking of this move, Ifty Islam, a managing partner at a Dhaka-based asset management
company stated “it’s hard to continue to improve factory compliance when there’s ever-increasing
downward pressure on the prices that global retailers are willing to pay.”58 This structural conflict
between workers and industrialists is entirely within the theater of globalized production.
P r e ca r i t y, M a rg i na l i z at i o n, a n d t h e S o c i o - P o l i t i ca l Bat t l e f o r D h a k a
As has been seen earlier, Bangladeshi RMG workers are up against large institutional limitations
under the pressure of market forces. These limitations include the “superstructural divide”
between workers and unions as well as the criminalization of strikes through legislation such as
the Bangladesh Labour Act of 2006. Other notable limitations include the corruption in political
parties and lack of coherent and direct international support for the workers’ movement. These
54“Resolve Anarchy in Industrial Sector with Sincerity: Sahara,” Daily Star, December 5, 2010,
https://www.thedailystar. net/news-detail-164826.
55Patrick Barta, “Culture of Mass Strikes Suffocates Bangaldesh’s Economy,” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2013,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323971204578628043063823914.
56Ibid.
57Ibid.
58Al-Mahmood et al., “Bangladesh Fire Raises Pressure.”

Riots Contra Global Capital

11

limitations have helped shape the workers’ response to their immiseration by forcing them to be
spontaneous rather than organized and destructive of industry as opposed to engaging in peaceful
negotiations with industrialists. These workers, however, are not simply responding to a lack of
institutional, parliamentary political power, but rather the riot is political in its nature as a tactic
when striking at a center point of global textile production.
Among the idiosyncrasies of the capitalist world economy is the unity of the political and
economic. That is, no longer does economic or political power rest only in town or country
respectively, but the dominant political class is also the dominant economic class. Economic
struggles become political struggles, and vice versa. As Engels notes of England’s great urban
transformation in The Condition of the Working Class in England:
They [the workers] were comfortable in their silent vegetation, and but for the
industrial revolution they would never have emerged from this existence, which,
cozily romantic as it was, was nevertheless not worthy of human beings. In truth,
they were not human beings; they were merely toiling machines in the service of the
few aristocrats who had guided history down to that time. The industrial revolution
has simply carried this out to its logical conclusion by making the workers machines
pure and simple, taking from them the last trace of independent activity and so
forcing them to think and demand a position worthy of men. As in France politics, so
in England manufacture, and the movement of civil society in general drew into the
whirl of history the last classes which had remained sunk in apathetic indifference to
the universal interests of mankind.59
Insofar as the Bangladeshi working class has been the product of an industrialization process
on a mass scale, its entrance into the city and the world of production is an entrance into the
political-economic realm. Its assault against the factories and struggle with industrialists and
the global economy are a means of testing their political power as much as they are improving
working conditions; in fact the two are essentially the same. The political immobility of corrupt
parliamentary politics is shaken off in the avenues of the general strike and riot.
But RMG workers are also marked by a distinctive precarity and thus marginalization in their
working and living conditions. That is, the workers are superfluous, unskilled, and ultimately
disposable to industry. The slum, in this case, embodies this facet of their existence, as it is a
living condition equal to the overall cost of their labor (see below). These spaces are cramped,
overpopulated, subject to eviction, and prone to massive life-threatening fires. In the words of
a female garment worker when speaking with a researcher: “You want to know about our life.
Housing is the biggest problem. Today ‘shorkar’ (government) is coming to evict us at 10:30am.
So we don’t have much time to talk. We don’t know what will happen after that.”60
The phenomenon of the slum, however, is not new to industrialization; to the contrary, in fact,
as Engels noted in his own time: “Every great city has one or more slums, where the working
class is crowded together. True, poverty often dwells in hidden alleys close to the palaces of the
rich; but, in general, a separate territory has been assigned to it, where, removed from the sight
of the happier classes, it may struggle along as it can.”61 The massive growth of slums is also
not confined to Bangladesh alone, but is to be discovered in many parts of the developing world
59Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),
17, emphasis added.
60Syeda Sharmin Absar, “Women Garment Workers in Bangladesh,” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 29
(2002): 3012-3016.
61Ibid., 39.
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as the transition from rural to urban accelerates beyond the planning capabilities of third-world
states. In the age of the globalization, the slum is the primary living condition of the growing
urban poor in the Global South. The slum is then the globalized form of the capitalist city. Mike
Davis, writing on the slum and the global city in the present day in Planet of Slums, states:
Thus, the cities of the future, rather than being made out of glass and steel as
envisioned by earlier generations of urbanists, are instead largely constructed out of
crude brick, straw, recycled plastic, cement blocks, and scrap wood. Instead of cities
of light soaring toward heaven, much of the twenty-first century urban world squats
in squalor, surrounded by pollution, excrement, and decay. Indeed, the one billion
city-dwellers who inhabit postmodern slums might well look back with envy at the
ruins of the sturdy mud homes of Çatal Hüyük in Anatolia, erected at the very dawn
of city life nine thousand years ago.62
As is discussed in the UN’s thorough and Engelsian 2003 report, The Challenge of Slums,
slums owe their existence in part due to the lack of political mobilization or even the ability to do
so among residents.63 Slums in Bangladesh are also conducive to riots, as the enclosed terrain
is within walking proximity to the factory, their starkest reminder of exploitation and general
suffering. As Hobsbawm noted, the emergence of riots in the late twentieth century was due in
large part to:
[T]he increase in the number of buildings worth rioting against or occupying, and
the development in their vicinity of accumulations of potential rioters. For while it
is true that the headquarters of central and municipal government are increasingly
remote from the riotous quarters, and the rich or noble rarely live in palaces in the
town centers (apartments are both less vulnerable and more anonymous), sensitive
institutions of other kinds have multiplied. There are the communications centers
(telegraph, telephone, radio, television). The least experienced organizer of a military
coup or insurrection knows all about their importance.64
For the Bangladeshi RMG workers, their sensitive institutions are the factories, transportation
trucks, and highways, symbols of their relationship with the supply chain. With the Industrial
Police mobilized to contain and repress this immiserated population from reprisal, the reality of
this socio-political battleground becomes clear. Slums allow industrialists to keep the working
class benign to their own political power, a means of disarming them in squalor. The hartal as a
tactic is then a strategic intervention to force the hand of the industrialists and the state. The riot is
the most formidable response to problems that the state and parliamentary democracy have failed
to ameliorate. Thus, the socio-political context of the slum becomes gradually more evident in
light of the reality of workers’ limited institutional political power.
I n f o r m a l i z at i o n a n d t h e D h a k a S lu m
The slum, in the case of the globalized Bangladeshi industrial landscape, also carries an economic
function. As the global labor force grows at an exponential rate, those within these slums are
62Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (New York: Verso, 2017), 17.
63United Nations Human Settlements Program, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003
(London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications, 2003), 68.
64Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Cities and Insurrections,” Global Urban Development Magazine 1, no. 1 (May 2005).
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being accommodated for their labor with this housing. In this way, their housing is seen as equal
to their value as workers. At first this seems obtuse and anecdotal, but slums in themselves are
critical as a site of this production process. For industrialists, in fact, the stagnant conditions of the
slums make workers an easily accessible pool of cheap labor, often for informalized production.
Slums, therefore, are a tool of capital accumulation, a place where labor power, the catalyzing
commodity of production, can be maintained at a low cost.
Informalization, precarity, and globalized production then go hand in hand with the slum:
When a large portion of an urban population resides in slums and squatter settlements
(for example, in Mumbai, Mexico City or Dhaka), the hiring prospects for small
industrial and service firms are enhanced because labor costs are kept low by
severe job competition among a plentiful labor supply in the informal sector. The
tradeoff is that an expanding informal labor market increases wage instability, job
turnover, the exploitation of women and children in low-wage jobs, and the income
disparity between socio-economic groups. Currently, dominant globalization and the
associated “informalization” of the economy that is seen in many places is not only
widening the chasm between rich and poor, but also generates “a large growth in the
demand for low-wageworkers and for jobs that offer few advancement possibilities.”
Increasingly, the informalization of low-wage jobs becomes the burden of women
and new immigrants.65
In Bangladesh and Dhaka, this informal sector composes 65 percent of workers overall.66
The city’s poor, while making up 70 percent of the city’s population, inhabit only 20 percent of
the area.67 This massive urban population is then surplus to production; it shares only a tentative
and marginal relation to production, and is disposable, as mass dismissals during strikes have
demonstrated. Its fluidity in production then allows it to be immediately malleable and used in
shifts in production.
In the RMG sector specifically, informalization has been critical to cope with large and sudden
shifts in global demand while maintaining production levels. According to an NYU study, the
total number of export volumes fluctuated, but exporter numbers remained the same, meaning
that exporters use informalization to accommodate to a number of shifts.68 This strategy is
built to ensure the RMG sector’s security in the global marketplace, yet is hinged on lowering
wages, quickly building new factories with the same machinery, and dramatically extending the
working day. While direct exporters “assume responsibility of every aspect of production,” the
informal sector allows producers to circumvent minimum wage laws and safety standards that
would otherwise damage already fragile profit margins.69 In two sub-districts of Dhaka alone, 32
percent of the 479 factories were informal.70
On one hand, the necessity of low wages to stabilize profit margins and preserve the RMG
sector is a response to the global economy’s incentivization of them. On the other hand, workers
are condemned to stagnant mobility as a result. In the informal sector, this means harsher labor
practices and lower wages. In the formal sector, however, RMG workers are also marked by
65United Nations, The Challege of Slums, 68.
66Davis, Planet of Slums, 116-117.
67Ibid., 94-95.
68Dorthée Baumann-Pauly and Sarah Labowitz, “Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg: Bangladesh’s Forgotten Apparel Workers,” NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, 2015, http://people.stern.nyu.edu/twadhwa/
bangladesh/downloads/beyond_the_tip_of_the_iceberg_report.pdf.
69Ibid.
70Ibid.

14

b e n ja m i n

a distinctive precarity and thus marginalization to the production process. The most obvious
example of this general condition is the mass firings following labor disputes.
In 2016, RMG workers mobilized in a spontaneous strike in response to the torture of workers,
rising rent/market prices, and unsafe conditions without compensation. When the strike began,
factory owners immediately shut down around eighty-four factories, firing workers en masse.
Upon doing this, industrialists declared the strike illegal due to its spontaneity, and their actions
justified under article 13(1) of the Labour Act.71 In 2019 around five thousand workers would
be fired; three thousand would have cases filed against them, and one hundred arrested, with
Ben Venpeperstraete (garment labor activist) claiming the government was actively working to
suppress the labor movement.72
The disposable RMG workers are also some of the least productive in comparison to regional
competitors, such as those of Sri Lanka, South Korea, and Hong Kong, yet the industry has
managed its competitive advantage of low wages predicated on the labor of these unskilled female
workers.73 In order to compensate for low skills and flatlined technological improvements, the
Bangladeshi industrialist has also extended the working day. In one study, for example, it was
found that 72 percent of respondent RMG workers labored 10 to 12 hours a day, 12 percent
working more than that.74
This informalization and extension of the working day has been done in part to ensure
production quotas stay in place without having to make costly improvements to existing constant
capital in order to stay afloat in the market. The brutality that the RMG workers are up against
often comes not only in the form of the aforementioned production strategies, but from their
productive consequences. The most obvious and infamous example being the Rana Plaza disaster
and Tazreen industrial fire (see above). The former being the result of a low quality and expedited
three-floor addition to the factory and the latter due to the lack of adequate fire escapes and
alarms. While the Bangladeshi labor revolts themselves attracted limited international attention,
the disasters would elicit an unparalleled global response to the textile industry.

T h e G l o ba l R e s p o n s e
With the unprecedented disaster at Rana Plaza shocking the world, the cyclical dynamics
of Bangladesh’s RMG sector became a focal point of international labor and human rights
organizations. While abusive and exploitative working conditions have been a focal point of
global concern for many years, the response to Rana Plaza directly challenged the ethics of
the global supply chain and the consumer habits of western citizens. Corporations that source
heavily from Bangladesh, such as H&M, Walmart, and Gap, immediately had to answer for their
participation in this dynamic. While numerous solutions were generated, they have yet to prove
their enforceability or capacity to undermine the weight of the global market in the Bangladeshi
dynamic.
71Ibrahim Hossain Ovi and Nadim Hossain Savar, “What Are the Ashulia Protests About?” Dhaka Tribune, December
22, 2016.
72“Almost 5,000 Bangladeshi Garment Workers Sacked Over Strikes,” Al-Jazeera, January 29, 2019.
73K. M. Faridul Hasan et al., “Role of Textile and Clothing Industries in the Growth and Development of Trade and
Business Strategies of Bangladesh in the Global Economy,” International Journal of Textile Science 5, no. 3 (2016):
39-48.
74Md Islam and Kamrul Dilara Zahid, “Socioeconomic Deprivation and Garment Worker Movement in Bangladesh:
A Sociological Analysis,” American Journal of Sociological Research 2, no. 4 (2012): 82-84.
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In the immediate aftermath of this disaster came the Accord on Fire and Building Safety,
drafted by the IndustriALL Global Union and the UNI Global Union to create a framework
by which the structural safety of factories could be ensured through cooperation between trade
unions and industrialists. The Accord was signed by H&M, American Eagle, Hugo Boss, and
several others.75 Following this, North American companies created their own Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety to achieve a similar task on their own terms. The Alliance was signed
by Gap, Fruit of the Loom, Kohl’s, Walmart, and others.76 Both of these frameworks hope to
make safety standards an enforceable and necessary facet of Bangladeshi industry in response to
the disaster. As direct connections were drawn between retail corporations and the Rana Plaza
factory in the supply chain, prevention of this disaster also became a growingly pertinent issue for
the stability of the brands’ reputations.77 With renewed and mounting pressure campaigns, the
Bangladeshi situation, while already globalized, was experiencing an intensified form of globality.
Globalization then became the object of critique in the ideal as well as material form. The Accord
and Alliance would address these concerns.
But as the material was being drafted, doubts concerning these policies were already fomenting.
In an interview with Huffington Post, Amirul Haque Amin, president of the National Garment
Workers Federation, said, “Improvement is not happening.” The news outlet reported:
[A] total of 600 workers have died in factory accidents in the last decade. “The
multinational companies claim a lot of things. They claim they have very good
policies, they have their own code of conduct, they have their auditing and monitoring
system,” Amin said. “But yet these things keep happening.”78
The same article also noted that the Tazreen and Rana Plaza buildings both passed inspection,
and checklist regulation standards in the hands of approved NGOs might not be sufficient to truly
ameliorate the situation.79 Indeed, the sheer number of factories in Dhaka alone presented a
challenge in terms of enforceability, where the application of both the Accord and Alliance may be
insufficient to truly tackle the issue. The Accord itself requires corporations to contribute money
directly toward the safety inspection efforts, holding them partially responsible by requiring a
$500,000 a year donation for these purposes.80 For this reason, Walmart and H&M believed
that the primary responsibility for factory safety lies in the hands of the Bangladeshi state and
industry, giving impetus to the creation of the Alliance.81 International labor organizers, such
as UNI Global Union general secretary Philip Jennings, claimed Walmart had “sunk to a new
low” by doing this.82 As widespread as the concern for Bangladesh’s place in the supply chain
was, it was unable to apply itself directly to the point of production and force the hand the global
economy’s largest interlocuters.
While concerns for the Accord and Alliance’s enforceability grew and the mainstays of the
supply chain attempted to shirk responsibility, the structural reality of the Bangladeshi situation
was soon to be realized by many adherents of international labor liberalism. The capacity for large
75Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, accessed December, 5, 2019, https://bangladeshaccord.org.
76Alliance for Bangladesh Workers Safety, accessed December 5, 2019, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/.
77Steven Greenhouse, “As Firms Line Up on Factories, Wal-Mart Plans Solo Effort,” New York Times, May 14, 2013,
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/six-retailers-join-bangladesh-factory-pact.html?pagewanted=all.
78Kay Johnson, “Major Retailers Rejected Bangladesh Factory Safety Plan,” Huffington Post, April 26, 2013.
79Ibid.
80Accord on Fire and Building Safety.
81Johnson, “Major Retailers Rejected.”
82IndustriALL Global Union, “We Made It! – Global Breakthrough as Retail Brands Sign Up to Bangladesh Factory
Safety Deal,” accessed December 5, 2019, http://www.industriall-union.org/we-made-it-global-breakthrough-as-retailbrands-sign-up-to-bangladesh-factory-safety-deal.
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international labor organizations to directly mediate and stabilize the situation was growingly dim.
As Doug Miller presciently pointed out, liberalization of trade had left enforcement of global
policy in an ambiguous place; thus agreements made even in collective bargaining (as opposed to
unilateral codes of conduct) can be circumvented through EPZs and informalization.83
As time continued, studies began to show the Alliance and Accord to have had little general
impact on Bangladeshi factory safety. As Miller noted, not only were producers able to circumvent
newly imposed standards and codes of conduct, but informal factories were virtually impossible
to track by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and could not be held accountable to
any standards. In one case, the ILO had mismeasured the sheer number of workers in the RMG
sector by one million, as discovered in an NYU Stern study.84 Thus, the Accord’s program of
remediation and training was only touching the “tip of the iceberg.”85
While other studies argued that informalization had not curtailed the observational capability
of the Accord, the Bangladeshi situation would continue to unravel and escape the public eye as
time went on.86 As recently as 2019, fifty thousand workers launched wildcat strikes over poor
pay.87 After mass vandalism and looting, twelve thousand workers were fired indiscriminately.
H&M responded, stating that they were “closely monitoring the situation.”88 Soon some began
to question the impact of the Accord, arguing that while it provided a level of safety standards,
it conveniently gleaned over the workers’ rights to organize and establish a minimum wage.
Chaumtoli Huq, a labor law professor at CUNY stated, “What’s odd is that you have these
two parallel movements—you have the Accord piece and you have the wages and unionization
piece.”89 Thus while providing an amount of stability and mediation between workers and bosses,
the international labor movement is seeing its capabilities challenged at the point of production.
At the point of production there then remains the dynamic between the workers, the state, and
global capital.
Co nc lu s i o n
As has been uncovered, the dynamic of the Bangladeshi labor movement is a decidedly global one.
Workers have responded (and are actively responding) to globalized industrial conditions, being
led by economic forces into packed cities and slums; their industrial experience has been marked
by inflexible, substandard, low wages to meet market demands. The institutional limitations
placed upon the RMG workers generated a tenacious movement and, indeed, attack on the global
supply chain. But as mentioned earlier, globalized production in Bangladesh is also stagnating
rapidly, as the RMG sector plateaued and then declined in the nation’s overall GDP makeup. Thus
while attempts at maintaining quotas by extending the working day and the previously discussed
83Doug Miller, “Preparing for the Long Haul: Negotiating International Framework Agreements in the Global Textile,
Garment and Footwear Section,” Global Social Policy 4, no. 2 (2004): 215-239.
84Gillian B. White, “Are Factories in Bangladesh Any Safer Now?” Atlantic, December 17, 2015, https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/bangladesh-factory-workers/421005/.
85Ibid.
86Jennifer Bair and Mark Anner, “The Bulk of the Iceberg: A Critique of the Stern Center’s Report on Worker
Safety in Bangladesh,” PennState Center for Global Workers Rights, 2016, https://ler.la.psu.edu/gwr/documents/
CGWRCritiqueofSternReport.pdf.
87Saurav Sarkar, “Bangladesh Accord Gets a Lifeline While Workers Organize Wildcat Strikes,” Labor Notes, August
6, 2019, https://www.labornotes.org/2019/08/bangladesh-accord-gets-lifeline-while-workers-organize-wildcat-strikes.
88“Bangladesh: Widespread Garment Worker Protests Over Minimum Wage Increase; Leads to Mass Dismissals,”
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre.
89Sarkar, “Bangladesh Accord.”
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informalization managed to stabilize the situation, a decline in the industry’s overall growth is
looming. A potential crisis of overproduction would bring about a significant and potentially
devastating change to Bangladeshi labor and economy.
As the situation continues to unravel and the internal dynamic is seemingly unending, the
future of Bangladesh remains in relation to the global market and its own internal conditions, as
was the genesis of its industrial system. The Bangladeshi labor movement has responded and
continues to respond to this by its own means, slowly gaining wages and continuing to apply real
terminal pressure on Bangladeshi industrialists without restraint. Whatever the result of this labor
movement may be, it will be indicative of industrialization in a globalized capitalist economy, as
have the lessons of the Bangladeshi labor movement.
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